

Profit, Self-Interest, and Deforestation: A Qualitative Literature Review Through Adam Smith

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
<p>Keywords: <i>Deforestation, Self-Interest, Sustainable Development, Qualitative Literature Review</i></p> <p>DOI: 10.22437/jssh.v10i1.54574</p> <p>Received: April 17th, 2026</p> <p>Reviewed: May 15th, 2026</p> <p>Accepted: May 19th, 2026</p>	<p><i>Deforestation remains a major socio-environmental problem because forest conversion often remains economically attractive despite its widely recognized ecological and social costs. This study examines how profit-seeking helps explain decisions that lead to forest loss and considers how conservation-oriented choices can be strengthened without neglecting livelihood needs. Using a qualitative literature review and document analysis of foundational economic texts, peer-reviewed studies on deforestation, environmental behavior research, and policy reports on sustainable forest governance, the study identifies four recurring patterns. First, forests are often treated as assets that can be converted into short-term income through timber extraction, agricultural expansion, infrastructure development, and land speculation. Second, Adam Smith's concept of self-interest helps explain why actors prioritize immediate economic returns, but it does not fully account for environmental decision-making, which is also shaped by institutions, social norms, moral responsibility, and education. Third, profit-seeking becomes more damaging where property rights are weak, monitoring is limited, and policy enforcement is inconsistent. Fourth, conservation outcomes tend to improve when economic incentives are restructured through community forestry, payments for ecosystem services, and livelihood-oriented sustainable development strategies. This study contributes to debates on forest governance by showing that deforestation is shaped not by profit alone, but by the interaction of economic motivation, institutional conditions, and ethical regulation.</i></p>

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1. Introduction

Forests play a vital role in climate regulation, biodiversity conservation, soil stability, water systems, and the livelihoods of millions of people. Nevertheless, global forest loss continues despite decades of environmental campaigns, scientific warnings, and international commitments. The Food and Agriculture Organization reported that 420 million hectares of forest were lost through conversion to other land uses between 1990 and 2020, while annual deforestation still averaged around 10 million hectares between 2015 and 2020 (FAO, 2020). Agriculture also remains the leading driver of deforestation in most regions, with livestock production, cropland expansion, and related commodity systems accounting for most forest conversion (FAO, 2022). These figures show that deforestation is not a marginal or accidental

process, but one embedded in systems of production, exchange, and governance that continue to make forest clearing economically rational for many actors.

A large body of scholarship has examined the material drivers of deforestation. Classical syntheses distinguish proximate causes, such as agricultural expansion, wood extraction, and infrastructure growth, from underlying drivers, including market incentives, governance failures, demographic pressures, and technological change (Geist & Lambin, 2002; Runyan & Stehm, 2020). Later studies have refined this account by showing how accessibility, agricultural profitability, market integration, and policy design shape both the location and pace of deforestation (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017, 2023). More recent research has further emphasized that tropical deforestation is linked not only to local land users but also to global commodity chains and distant consumer demand (Pendrill et al., 2019; West et al., 2025). In this sense, deforestation can be understood both as a local land-use decision and as part of a wider transnational political-economic process.

Although this literature is substantial, an important interpretive gap remains. Much of the existing research explains which sectors and conditions are associated with deforestation, but gives less attention to the practical economic reasoning through which forest conversion is justified or normalized. In many cases, the literature identifies the drivers of forest loss more readily than it explains why those drivers come to appear legitimate, necessary, or even unavoidable. This matters because environmental degradation is shaped not only by external pressures, but also by ideas about value, benefit, progress, and responsibility. Forest clearing is often defended through the language of income, productivity, employment, development, and necessity. To understand why deforestation persists, it is therefore useful to revisit intellectual traditions that help explain the enduring appeal of self-benefit in economic decision-making.

Adam Smith offers a useful starting point for this discussion. His work is often cited to explain how self-interest coordinates economic activity and encourages individuals to pursue productive opportunities. In simplified interpretations, this framework is sometimes reduced to the claim that private benefit naturally produces public good. However, Smith's thought is more nuanced than such a reading suggests. His analysis helps explain why individuals pursue advantage, but it does not imply that all profit-seeking activity is socially or morally desirable. In the context of deforestation, Smith's framework raises a more specific question: under what conditions does self-interest contribute to social benefit, and under what conditions does it intensify ecological harm?

This question is especially relevant because forests occupy an ambiguous position in contemporary development. On the one hand, they are living ecological systems with long-term public value. On the other hand, they are treated as economic resources whose conversion can generate immediate private returns. Timber can be sold quickly, land can be converted to agriculture, and cleared areas can be absorbed into infrastructure projects or speculative land markets. Where regulatory institutions are weak and alternative livelihoods are limited, the economic logic of forest conversion becomes especially persuasive. The problem, therefore, is not simply individual greed, but an incentive structure that often rewards short-term extraction more visibly and more immediately than long-term conservation.

Against this background, this study examines how the desire for profit influences decisions to cut down forests and considers what conditions may encourage forest protection instead. Rather than treating Adam Smith as a complete explanation for deforestation, the study uses his concept of self-interest as an interpretive lens for understanding the continuing appeal of profit-seeking in forest-related decision-making. At the same time, that lens is assessed in relation to more recent scholarship on institutions, ethics, education, and collective action.

This study makes three contributions. First, it offers a socio-humanities interpretation of deforestation by linking classical economic thought with contemporary research on forest loss. Second, it shows that self-interest is best understood as a partial explanation of deforestation, one that becomes more analytically meaningful when considered alongside institutional and moral factors. Third, it highlights practical pathways through which economic motivation may be redirected rather than merely condemned, including policy incentives, community governance, and education for sustainable development. These contributions are relevant to current discussions in social education, the social sciences, and sustainable development, particularly the need to understand environmental crises not only as ecological or technical failures but also as problems of value orientation and governance.

Rather than merely cataloguing the drivers of deforestation, this study offers a socio-humanities interpretation of how profit-seeking is socially normalized and rendered legitimate through the interaction of classical economic thought, institutional weakness, and contemporary forest governance. Accordingly, this study addresses the following main question: How does the desire for profit influence people's decisions to cut down forests? It also considers a related question: What can help people choose to protect forests instead of prioritizing short-term gain? Together, these questions enable the study to move from explanation toward a grounded discussion of possible responses.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Deforestation and the Economic Logic of Forest Conversion

A substantial body of scholarship has shown that deforestation is closely linked to economic processes that make forest conversion appear profitable and rational. Geist and Lambin (2002) identified agricultural expansion, infrastructure development, and wood extraction as recurring proximate causes of tropical deforestation, while policy failures, market forces, and social dynamics function as important underlying drivers. Later meta-analyses further demonstrate that deforestation is more likely where agricultural returns are high, where access is facilitated by roads and nearby settlements, and where state protections are weak or unevenly enforced (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017, 2023). This literature suggests that forest loss is not simply the result of isolated acts of tree cutting, but of broader systems of valuation in which forests are converted into productive land, tradable timber, or speculative property.

This perspective is strengthened by research on trade-related deforestation. Pendrill et al. (2019) showed that international trade accounts for a substantial share of tropical deforestation emissions, indicating that forest loss is linked not only to local production but also to distant consumption. Similarly, West et al. (2025) highlights how commodity production and global markets redistribute responsibility for forest loss across countries and sectors. Taken together, these studies show that the economic logic of deforestation extends beyond local decision-makers and is embedded in wider regional and global systems that reward commodity expansion.

2.2 Self-Interest and the Moral Ambiguity of Economic Action

One useful line of interpretation for understanding this economic logic is Adam Smith's concept of self-interest. In *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Smith argued that individuals often pursue their own advantage and that this pursuit can help organize economic activity in ways that generate broader social benefits (Smith, 1776). This idea is commonly associated with the metaphor of the invisible hand. However, scholarship has long cautioned against reducing Smith's thought to a blanket justification of all profit-

seeking behavior. Such a reading is especially problematic in environmental contexts, where profitable action may generate severe ecological and social harm.

Applied to deforestation, Smith's concept of self-interest helps explain why actors continue to support forest conversion even when they are aware of its long-term environmental consequences. Logging companies seek revenue, farmers seek productive land, households seek livelihoods, and political actors may support extractive activities in the name of growth or public finance. In this context, immediate gain is often more visible and concrete than future ecological loss, which tends to be diffuse, delayed, and collectively borne. At the same time, Smith's broader moral philosophy makes clear that self-interest alone cannot determine whether an action is socially desirable. Economic action is always shaped by norms, justice, and institutional arrangements. For that reason, self-interest is best understood not as a sufficient explanation of deforestation, but as one important interpretive element within a wider social and moral framework.

2.3 Institutions, Governance, and Forest Loss

The literature also shows that economic motivation does not operate in isolation. Whether self-interest leads to forest destruction or restraint depends heavily on institutional context. Deforestation is shaped by land governance, law enforcement, tenure security, and the availability of incentives for conservation. Balboni et al. (2023) argue that pressure for land-use change, weak property rights, and political constraints are central to explaining why forest loss continues. Likewise, Seymour and Harris (2019) show that reversing tropical deforestation requires combinations of interventions rather than isolated technical solutions. Furumo and Lambin (2021) further demonstrate that policy sequencing matters, as command-and-control measures, incentives, and supply-chain interventions tend to be more effective when introduced in mutually reinforcing ways.

This body of work indicates that profit-seeking becomes especially damaging where institutions fail to internalize ecological costs. In settings where regulation is weak, monitoring is limited, and land rights are insecure, forest conversion is more likely to appear legitimate and economically sensible. Conversely, where institutions reward conservation, enforce accountability, and support sustainable livelihoods, the same economic motivations may be redirected toward less destructive outcomes.

2.4 Environmental Ethics, Education, and Pro-Environmental Behavior

A further strand of literature broadens the explanation of deforestation beyond narrowly economic reasoning by examining environmental ethics and pro-environmental behavior. Stern (2000) argues that environmentally significant behavior is shaped not only by financial incentives but also by values, beliefs, norms, habits, and contextual conditions. Steg and Vlek (2009) similarly show that behavioral change is more likely when interventions address underlying motivations while also removing situational barriers. Gifford and Nilsson (2014) review a broad range of personal and social influences, including education, knowledge, perceived control, responsibility, and social influence.

This literature is important because it helps explain why some individuals and communities choose to protect forests even when extraction could provide income. Moral responsibility, social recognition, cultural attachment, intergenerational concern, and ecological identity can all limit purely extractive choices. These considerations are especially relevant in sustainability education, where the aim is not only to transmit environmental knowledge but also to cultivate evaluative judgment and responsibility. UNESCO's framework for Education for Sustainable Development places knowledge, values, attitudes, and action-oriented learning at the center of sustainable transformation (UNESCO, 2017).

2.5 Research Gap

Taken together, the literature shows that deforestation is shaped by the interaction of economic incentives, institutional arrangements, and moral-environmental considerations. However, less attention has been given to how forest conversion is justified or normalized at the level of practical economic reasoning, especially through ideas of profit, benefit, development, and necessity. This study addresses that gap by examining how the desire for profit influences decisions to cut down forests and what conditions may encourage forest protection instead.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research Design

This study employed a qualitative literature review and document analysis design. The study was designed to interpret how profit-seeking is represented, justified, and challenged in scholarship on deforestation rather than to measure the statistical prevalence of forest-loss drivers. A qualitative approach was therefore appropriate because the research focuses on meaning, justification, and the relationship between economic motivation, institutional context, and environmental responsibility.

3.2 Data Sources and Corpus

The final corpus comprised 24 sources. These included 1 foundational economic text, 19 peer-reviewed journal articles and review essays, and 4 institutional or policy documents. The corpus covered publications from 1776 to 2025, with primary emphasis on contemporary literature published between 2000 and 2025. Earlier works were retained only when they were conceptually foundational to the study, particularly Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* and key sustainability frameworks relevant to environmental governance.

The sources were selected because they addressed one or more of the following dimensions of the research problem: economic motivation, forest conversion, land-use governance, environmental behavior, moral responsibility, and sustainability-oriented alternatives. The corpus was not intended to function as an exhaustive systematic review of all deforestation scholarship. Instead, it was constructed as a conceptually focused body of material sufficient to address the research question with analytical depth and credibility.

3.3 Search Strategy and Selection Criteria

Sources were identified through keyword-based searches in academic search engines and journal platforms, complemented by backward reference tracking from relevant review articles and institutional reports. Search terms included deforestation, forest loss, self-interest, profit, Adam Smith, forest governance, environmental behavior, sustainable development, payments for ecosystem services, community forestry, and tropical deforestation. The search process prioritized literature published between 2000 and 2025, while allowing the inclusion of earlier foundational works central to the conceptual framing.

Sources were included when they met three criteria. First, they had to contribute directly to one or more dimensions of the research problem, namely profit-seeking, forest conversion, governance and institutional regulation, environmental responsibility, or conservation-oriented alternatives. Second, they had to come from credible scholarly or institutional sources, including peer-reviewed journals and authoritative international organizations. Third, they had to offer theoretical significance, empirical evidence, or policy relevance for interpreting the relationship between profit-seeking and deforestation.

Sources were excluded when they were duplicate records, non-scholarly opinion pieces, news items without analytical relevance, or publications whose focus was too distant from the study's conceptual scope. Materials were also excluded when they did not contribute substantively to the interpretation of economic motivation, governance, environmental behavior, or forest protection.

3.4 Data Analysis

The selected materials were analyzed using thematic synthesis. After repeated reading, the texts were coded according to recurring ideas related to economic motivation, the drivers of forest conversion, institutional mediation, ethical responsibility, and conservation-oriented responses. These codes were then grouped into broader analytical themes. Four themes emerged consistently across the corpus: forests as economic assets, self-interest as a partial explanation of forest-conversion decisions, governance as a mediator of profit-seeking, and incentive redirection as a condition for more viable conservation outcomes. Thematic synthesis was used because it allows conceptually diverse materials to be read in an integrated way while preserving distinctions between explanation, institutional context, and normative response.

3.5 Analytical Rigor

To strengthen analytical rigor, the study used source triangulation across classical political economy, contemporary empirical research on deforestation, environmental behavior scholarship, and institutional or policy literature. This made it possible to compare how different disciplinary perspectives describe the same underlying problem and reduced the risk of relying on a single explanatory framework. Analytical consistency was also strengthened by comparing themes across multiple source types rather than drawing conclusions from one category of literature alone.

4. Findings

The thematic synthesis identified four recurring findings concerning the relationship between profit-seeking and deforestation. These findings are presented below in relation to the main patterns that emerged across the reviewed literature.

4.1. Economic motivation as a recurrent driver of forest loss

Across the reviewed literature, forests were consistently described as resources with immediate market value. Agricultural expansion, livestock production, timber extraction, and infrastructure development were repeatedly identified as major proximate causes of forest loss (Curtis et al., 2018; Feurer et al., 2025; Geist & Lambin, 2002). The economic returns associated with these activities made forest conversion attractive to a wide range of actors, from small-scale land users to large commodity-based production systems. Meta-analytic research also showed that higher expected returns from agriculture, livestock, and timber are consistently associated with greater deforestation pressure (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2017, 2023; Scullion et al., 2019). These findings indicate that forest loss is closely connected to economic systems that reward conversion more visibly and more immediately than conservation.

4.2. Self-interest as a partial explanation of forest-conversion decisions

The reviewed literature supported the relevance of Adam Smith's concept of self-interest in explaining why actors prioritize income, productivity, and immediate benefit. Research on forest economics and land-use change repeatedly showed that actors respond to incentives

that make forest clearing financially meaningful (Balboni et al., 2023; Rueda et al., 2019). However, the same body of literature also made clear that economic motivation alone does not fully explain environmentally significant behavior. Studies on environmental values and pro-environmental action identified norms, moral responsibility, social influence, and education as important factors shaping whether individuals or communities accept or resist environmentally harmful choices (Gifford & Nilsson, 2014; Steg & Vlek, 2009; Stern, 2000). This suggests that self-interest helps explain part of the logic of forest conversion, but not the full range of motivations that shape environmental decision-making.

4.3. Weak governance intensifies the harmful effects of profit-seeking

A third recurring pattern concerned the role of governance. The literature consistently showed that forest loss is more likely when institutions are unable to regulate land conversion effectively. Weak monitoring, insecure tenure, limited law enforcement, and incoherent policy frameworks were all associated with greater deforestation pressure (Busch & Ferretti-Gallon, 2023; Furumo & Lambin, 2021). Under these conditions, profit-seeking operates with limited ecological restraint. By contrast, stronger governance, clearer policy sequencing, and more coherent institutional arrangements improve the possibility of reducing forest loss. These findings indicate that self-interest does not operate independently, but is shaped by the regulatory and political context in which decisions are made.

4.4. Conservation becomes more viable when incentives are redirected

The final recurring finding was that forest protection is more effective when economic and social systems reward conservation rather than extraction. Literature on payments for environmental services, decentralized forest management, and community-based governance showed that conservation can be compatible with livelihood improvement under appropriate conditions (Börner et al., 2017; Miyamoto, 2020; Oldekop et al., 2019). Research on policy interventions also indicated that conservation outcomes are stronger when incentives are linked to institutions, local participation, and enforceable rules, rather than treated as isolated compensation mechanisms (Müller et al., 2013; Seymour & Harris, 2019). Overall, the literature suggests that conservation is more likely to endure when economic motivation is redirected, rather than simply opposed.

To clarify the evidentiary basis of these findings, Table 1 summarizes the main references reviewed in this study and their relevance to the research question. Table 2 then presents the thematic synthesis derived from those materials.

Table 1: Key Findings from the Reviewed Literature on Deforestation, Self-Interest, and Forest Protection

No.	Reference	Main finding	Relevance to the research question
1	Geist and Lambin (2002)	Tropical deforestation is driven by combinations of proximate causes and underlying forces, especially agriculture, wood extraction, and infrastructure expansion.	Shows that forest loss is strongly linked to material economic uses of land and timber.
2	Curtis et al. (2018)	Global forest loss can be classified into permanent conversion, commodity-driven deforestation, shifting agriculture, forestry, wildfire, and urbanization.	Demonstrates that a large share of forest loss is tied to production systems rather than random disturbance.
3	Busch and Ferretti-Gallon (2017)	Deforestation is associated with accessibility and higher agricultural returns.	Confirms that profit-related incentives structure forest-clearing decisions.

4	Pendrill et al. (2019)	International trade drives a substantial share of tropical deforestation emissions.	Indicates that profit-seeking is embedded in global commodity chains, not only local decisions.
5	Balboni et al. (2023)	Tropical deforestation reflects economic pressures, weak property rights, and political constraints.	Shows that profit motives interact with governance conditions.
6	Stern (2000)	Environmentally significant behavior is shaped by values, beliefs, norms, and context.	Demonstrates that economic motivation alone is insufficient to explain environmental action.
7	Gifford and Nilsson (2014)	Pro-environmental concern and behavior are influenced by multiple personal and social factors, including knowledge and education.	Supports the role of ethics, education, and social context in moderating profit-driven choices.
8	Börner et al. (2017)	Payments for environmental services vary in effectiveness depending on design, context, and implementation.	Suggests that incentives can redirect self-interest toward conservation when properly designed.
9	Oldekop et al. (2019)	Community forest management in Nepal reduced both deforestation and poverty.	Indicates that forest protection and livelihood goals can be pursued together.
10	Furumo and Lambin (2021)	The sequencing of policies matters for reducing tropical deforestation.	Shows that institutional design affects whether profit incentives are restrained or redirected.

Table 2: Thematic Synthesis of the Literature

Theme	Core description	Dominant implication
Forests as economic assets	Forests are repeatedly framed as land, timber, and commodity opportunities.	Standing forests face pressure where immediate private gains exceed visible conservation rewards.
Self-interest as partial explanation	Profit-seeking helps explain why actors prefer conversion, but cannot explain all behavior.	Economic motivation is important but must be interpreted alongside values and institutions.
Governance as mediator	Enforcement, tenure, and policy coherence shape how self-interest is expressed.	Weak governance magnifies destructive extraction.
Incentive redirection	Conservation improves when livelihoods and ecological protection are linked.	Sustainable alternatives are more durable when they alter both prices and norms.

5. Discussion

The findings indicate that Adam Smith’s concept of self-interest remains useful for interpreting deforestation, but only when situated within a broader social and institutional explanation. Forest conversion is repeatedly driven by the expectation of gain. Land users, firms, and governments often respond to economic opportunities that make forest clearing appear rational, productive, or even necessary. In this sense, Smith’s insight into the motivating force of self-interest retains analytical value. It helps explain why deforestation continues even when its environmental harms are widely recognized. Immediate benefit often exerts greater influence on decision-making than diffuse and delayed ecological costs.

At the same time, the findings show why a purely Smithian explanation is inadequate. If self-interest alone determined outcomes, private incentives might be expected to align more closely with public well-being. Yet the literature reviewed here shows that such alignment does not occur automatically. Forests generate extensive public goods, including climate

stability, water regulation, habitat protection, and social resilience, but these benefits are often not fully incorporated into land-use decisions. The result is a structural imbalance in which private actors capture the gains of conversion while much of the ecological damage is borne collectively.

This imbalance helps clarify a common misunderstanding in simplified readings of classical liberal economics. Smith did not argue that every form of profit-seeking should be assumed to generate social good under all conditions. Rather, the productive potential of self-interest depends on institutions that structure exchange, secure justice, and restrain harmful conduct. In the case of deforestation, those conditions are often weak or unevenly enforced. Weak monitoring, uncertain tenure, policy incoherence, and political capture allow forest conversion to remain profitable even when it is socially damaging. The problem, therefore, is not self-interest in itself, but self-interest operating in systems that underprice ecological destruction and underreward conservation.

This interpretation is consistent with recent work in economic and governance research. Balboni et al. (2023) show that tropical deforestation must be understood through the interaction of economic pressure, property rights, and political constraints. Furumo and Lambin (2021) likewise demonstrate that no single instrument is likely to halt deforestation on its own. Where command-and-control measures, incentives, and market reforms are poorly sequenced or weakly coordinated, forest protection efforts become fragmented and less effective. These studies reinforce the argument that profit-seeking becomes more destructive when institutions fail to redirect it.

The reviewed literature also shows that forest protection cannot be understood simply as the opposite of profit. This point is important because environmental debates often rely on a moral contrast between selfish extractors and virtuous protectors. The evidence suggests a more complex reality. People and communities often protect forests not because economic concerns disappear, but because economic aspirations are reorganized within different institutional arrangements and value systems. Community forestry, payments for ecosystem services, sustainable livelihood programs, and ecotourism all reflect this logic, although with varying degrees of success. Rather than eliminating self-interest, such approaches seek to connect it to less destructive forms of behavior.

This perspective also helps explain why some conservation initiatives perform better than others. Programs that merely encourage people to care more about nature may have limited impact when livelihoods remain insecure and extractive activities continue to offer higher returns. Conversely, purely financial incentives may also fall short when they ignore social trust, local legitimacy, power inequalities, or ecological knowledge. Börner et al. (2017) show that payments for environmental services are highly sensitive to design and context, while Oldekop et al. (2019) provide evidence that decentralized community forest management can reduce both poverty and deforestation under appropriate institutional conditions. Together, these studies suggest that more effective alternatives emerge when material incentives, local participation, and normative commitment are combined.

Another implication concerns education. The problem examined in this study is not only economic, but also civic and moral. Why do people continue to choose environmentally harmful actions even when the damage is visible? The literature on environmental behavior offers a partial answer: action depends on how people understand responsibility, future consequences, collective norms, and their own capacity to make a difference (Gifford & Nilsson, 2014; Stern, 2000). From this perspective, education matters because it shapes the evaluative frameworks through which economic choices are interpreted. UNESCO's approach to Education for Sustainable Development emphasizes not only information, but also the development of values, skills, and action capacities for responsible living (UNESCO, 2017).

This educational dimension is especially relevant in socio-humanities research because environmental crises are also crises of interpretation. Forests are destroyed not only because chainsaws exist or because commodity prices rise, but because societies repeatedly legitimize certain meanings of development while marginalizing others. If education presents forests primarily as raw material or reserve land, profit-centered reasoning is likely to dominate. If education instead incorporates ecological interdependence, long-term thinking, and social responsibility into how development is understood, then the legitimacy of destructive conversion becomes easier to challenge.

Taken together, the findings support a three-part interpretation of deforestation. First, profit-seeking is a powerful and recurrent motive in forest conversion. Second, the social effects of that motive depend on institutions, governance quality, and collective norms. Third, sustainable alternatives become more viable when economic incentives are redesigned in ways that also strengthen moral and educational commitments to forest protection. This interpretation avoids two common mistakes: reducing deforestation to individual greed alone, and treating moral appeals as sufficient substitutes for structural reform.

The study also contributes to debates on sustainable development. The literature reviewed here does not support a simple opposition between economic growth and forest conservation. Instead, it points to the need to distinguish between extractive growth and regulated, livelihood-sensitive development. Miyamoto (2020) argues that poverty reduction can itself support forest conservation when it reduces dependence on destructive land-use strategies. Likewise, research on forest governance and community management indicates that conservation is more durable when linked to welfare gains and local legitimacy (Oldekop et al., 2019). These findings complicate the assumption that protecting forests necessarily requires sacrificing economic well-being. A more defensible conclusion is that conservation tends to fail where development is pursued through short-term extraction and is more likely to succeed where development is tied to institutional accountability and sustainable livelihoods.

At the same time, caution is necessary. Not all market-compatible conservation strategies are equally effective, and not all claims about green growth are convincing. Ecotourism can generate uneven benefits. Payments for ecosystem services can exclude marginalized groups. Supply-chain commitments can displace deforestation geographically rather than eliminate it. These limitations reinforce the central argument of this study: self-interest can be redirected, but it cannot be expected to regulate itself. Institutional design, public oversight, and value formation remain essential.

6. Conclusion

This study examined how the desire for profit influences decisions to cut down forests and what conditions may help redirect behavior toward forest protection. The reviewed literature consistently shows that deforestation is closely linked to economic motivation. Forests are often converted because timber extraction, agricultural expansion, pasture development, infrastructure projects, and speculative land use offer visible and immediate returns. In this context, Adam Smith's concept of self-interest provides a useful interpretive lens for understanding why forest conversion continues to attract human action.

At the same time, the analysis shows that self-interest alone does not adequately explain deforestation. Decisions about forests are shaped by institutions, governance quality, social values, moral judgment, and educational influence. Profit-seeking becomes especially destructive when environmental law is weak, monitoring is limited, land governance is uncertain, and the ecological costs of conversion remain externalized. By contrast, forest protection becomes more viable when institutions redesign incentives, strengthen participation, and connect livelihood improvement with conservation goals.

This study contributes to socio-humanities scholarship by linking classical political economy with contemporary research on forest governance and environmental behavior. Its central argument is that deforestation is best understood not as the automatic result of greed, nor as a purely technical policy failure, but as the product of economic motivation operating within particular moral and institutional contexts.

This study is limited by its literature-based design. It does not provide primary empirical evidence from a specific site, nor does it claim exhaustive systematic coverage of all forest-related scholarship. Future research could build on this interpretive framework through case studies, interviews, or comparative fieldwork examining how communities, firms, and local governments negotiate the tension between profit and environmental responsibility in specific settings.

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